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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

enforced; and (3) a mistake of law is not a ground for rescission or
cancellation of a deed. Applying these rules, the court found the
Herrmanns had no remedy of rescission or cancellation of the
warranty deed and thus affirmed the trial court's judgment.
JaredB. Briant

WASHINGTON
Kim v. Pollution Control Hearing Bd., 61 P.3d 1211 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) (holding an "industrial purposes" exception to a permitting
requirement for public ground waters applies to commercial
horticultural uses).
Joo I1Kim and Keum Ja Kim ("Kims") sought judicial review of a
final decision by the Pollution Control Hearing Board of Olympia,
Washington ("PCHB"). PCHB affirmed an order by the Department
of Ecology ("DOE"), requiring the Kims to apply for a permit to use
well water for their commercial nursery. The Superior Court for
Kitsap County affirmed the decision of the PCHB. The Kims appealed
to Division Two of the Court of Appeals of Washington. The court
decided the issue of whether the use of 100 to 300 gallons per day to
water plants for sale to the general public constituted "an industrial
purpose," thus falling under an exception to the permitting
requirement. The court reversed and held that the Kim's nursery fell
within the industrial exception.
The main controversy came from an interpretation of a 1945
statute requiring a permit to use the public ground waters of
Washington subject to a "small withdrawals" exception. This exception
applied in four instances: (1) any quantity of water for livestock;
(2) any amount of water for a noncommercial garden of a half acre or
less; (3) not more than 5,000 gallons per day for domestic use; and (4)
not more than 5,000 gallons per day for an industrial purpose.
In 1995, the DOE altered its interpretation of "industrial
purposes." DOE first asserted that the term "industry" excluded
agriculture. Second, the DOE argued that interpreting the industrial
exception to apply to irrigation made the exemption for
noncommercial gardens of one-half acre or less meaningless. Third, it
concluded that defining industrial purposes to include agriculture or
horticulture drastically increased the scope of the exception and
undermined the statute's purpose. In 1998, the DOE required that
the Kims file for a permit.
The court rejected all of the DOE's changed interpretations of the
1945 statute. The court noted that twenty-four Washington statutes,
ten Washington cases, and six Washington regulations refer to the
"agriculture industry."
The court also used the dictionary and
numerous other examples of reference to the "agriculture industry"
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from other jurisdictions to conclude that the "industrial purposes"
exception applied to the Kim's nursery. The court also rejected the
DOE's second argument because the noncommercial garden provision
differs from the Kim's commercial garden irrigation uses. Finally, the
court rejected the DOE's third argument because the DOE interpreted
the statute and applied it differently than in the past. An agency may
not alter the plain meaning of a statute to cater to changed societal
conditions. The legislature must amend the statute to properly
remedy a statute's application to changing societal needs.
Thus, the court reversed the superior court's ruling, and held that
the Kim's nursery fell within the industrial exception.
Adriano Martinez
McNally v. Zadra, No. 20426-0-III, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 68 (Wash.
Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (holding plaintiff landowners' rights in water
system passed appurtenant to their land; plaintiff landowners' efforts
to promote their shared water system's continued use complied with
easement agreement; and defendant landowner forfeited rights in the
water system by drilling a private well).
Plaintiffs William and Melody McNally ("McNallys") owned Lots C
and D, among other property, located adjacent to defendant Elizabeth
Zadra ("Zadra"), the owner of Lot A. Significantly, the lots shared a
water system which included buried water lines spanning across the
lots and a cistern on Lot A. The parties' predecessor in interest
conveyed the lots by real estate contract establishing appurtenant
easement rights in the water system. A few years later, the parties'
predecessor reassigned the rights in the water system to Lot 3. In
1993, Mr. McNally disconnected power to the pump house on his land
and removed the water line from the cistern located on Zadra's lot to
make repairs to the water system. As a result, a series of disputes
transpired between the landowners including issues of ownership and
responsibility for the water system.
The McNallys sued Zadra alleging the right to receive water by
running it over Zadra's lot. In 1996, the Superior Court of Stevens
County granted the McNallys' motion for partial summary judgment,
holding the easement in the water system was appurtenant to the
McNallys' land; therefore, it passed to them as a matter of law. The
McNallys also claimed Zadra drilled a separate well and should forfeit
her rights in the water system. The McNallys sought damages and
equitable relief for Zadra's interference with their easement rights.
Zadra counterclaimed alleging breach of water and road easements,
trespass, outrage, conversion and trespass to chattels. Subsequently, at
a bench trial in 1999, the trial court concluded the McNallys had not
breached the easement agreement and Zadra's separately drilled well
effectively relinquished her rights in the water system. As such, she was

